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Abstract 
Understanding how person-to-person contagious processes spread through a population requires 
accurate information on connections between population members. However, such connectivity 
data, when collected via interview, is often incomplete due to partial recall, respondent fatigue or 
study design, e.g., fixed choice designs (FCD) truncate out-degree by limiting the number of 
contacts each respondent can report. Past research has shown how FCD truncation affects 
network properties, but its implications for predicted speed and size of spreading processes 
remain largely unexplored. To study the impact of degree truncation on spreading processes, we 
generated collections of synthetic networks containing specific properties (degree distribution, 
degree-assortativity, clustering), and also used empirical social network data from 75 villages in 
Karnataka, India. We simulated FCD using various truncation thresholds and ran a susceptible-
infectious-recovered (SIR) process on each network. We found that spreading processes 
propagated on truncated networks resulted in slower and smaller epidemics, with a sudden 
decrease in prediction accuracy at a level of truncation that varied by network type. Our results 
have implications beyond FCD to truncation due to any limited sampling from a larger network. 
We conclude that knowledge of network structure is important for understanding the accuracy of 
predictions of process spread on degree truncated networks.  
Keywords: Social networks; Contact networks; Epidemics; Truncation; Spreading processes; 
Validity; Fixed choice design; Network epidemiology 
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Introduction 
Our understanding of how disease, knowledge and many other phenomena spread through a 
population can often be improved by investigating the population’s social or other contact 
structure, which can be naturally conceptualized as a network (Newman, 2002; Pastor-Satorras et 
al., 2015). In the case of human populations, this contact structure is often gathered through the 
use of questionnaires or surveys that typically ask respondents to name some of their contacts 
(Burt, 1984; Holland & Leinhardt, 1973). Generating population-level network structures from 
such data requires one of two possible approaches (Marsden, 2005). One approach is to delineate 
a population of interest, interview every person in the population, and collect unique identifiers 
for each respondent’s contacts; this allows the mapping of the true sociocentric network within 
that population. The alternative is to sample the population of interest and collect information 
about each respondent and his or her contacts; this results in a collection of egocentric networks 
from that population. Either approach enables the extraction of network features that can be used 
to fit a graph model, such as one of the models in the family of exponential random graphs 
(ERGMs) (Lusher et al., 2012), which allows the subsequent generation of network graphs 
consistent with the fitted features of the observed networks. The features that may be extracted 
from egocentric networks are however quite limited, making sociocentric networks the preferred 
design, resources allowing. 
Both egocentric and sociocentric approaches can place a considerable burden on the respondent 
to recall numerous contacts and describe each in detail (McCarty et al., 2007). As a result, most 
sample survey questionnaires, in both egocentric and sociocentric designs, limit the contacts 
sought from a respondent, for example by the content, intimacy level, geographic location or 
time frame of the relationship elucidated (Campbell & Lee, 1991). A common method is to limit 
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the number of contacts a respondent describes. This may be done directly, e.g. by asking “who 
are your five closest friends with whom you regularly socialize?” It may also be done indirectly, 
e.g. by asking “who are the friends with whom you socialize” but then only asking follow-up 
questions about the first five named (Burt, 1984; Kogovsek et al., 2010). A less-common variant 
of the second approach is for the interviewer to ask follow-up questions on a random subset of 
named contacts. 
More recently, there has been increasing interest in leveraging large-scale data on digitally 
mediated social interactions ranging from emails to online social networking services to mobile 
phone communication. Call detail records, resulting from mobile phone calls and text and 
multimedia messages, have become especially popular for capturing one-to-one social 
interactions in large populations (Blondel et al., 2015; Onnela et al., 2007a; Onnela et al., 
2007b). Social networks are constructed from these data typically by aggregating longitudinal 
interactions over a time window of fixed length, where the features of the resulting networks are 
fairly sensitive to the width of the aggregation window (Krings et al., 2012). Although some ad 
hoc approaches have been proposed, so far there are no statistically principled methods available 
for setting the window width. This leads to effective network degree truncation that is not a 
consequence of study design per se but rather is induced by the network construction process. 
While our focus here is degree truncation resulting from study design, we point out that many of 
our findings are applicable in other settings as well. 
 
All of the above approaches potentially lead to truncation of the number of observed contacts. 
There is longstanding concern within the sociological literature that such truncation might affect 
5 
 
estimates of network properties, including various forms of centrality (Holland & Leinhardt, 
1973). However, there are countervailing resource and data quality benefits to avoiding 
respondent and interviewer fatigue (McCarty et al., 2007). While investigating the effect of 
degree truncation on structural properties of networks is an important problem, substantive 
interest often lies in making inferences about how a dynamical process on the network, such as 
epidemic spread, might be affected by truncation. Surprisingly, while both the impact of degree 
truncation on structural properties of networks and the impact of structural properties on the 
spread of a dynamic process through a networked population have been investigated, the joint 
implications of the two processes have not yet been elucidated. To integrate key ideas from the 
two corpora, we review first the literature on the impact of truncating reported contacts on 
structural network properties, and second the literature on the impact of structural network 
properties on spread dynamics, to arrive at hypotheses regarding how truncation might change 
expected spreading process outcomes. While our work was motivated by epidemic disease 
processes, our analysis should be applicable to any process that can be modeled using 
compartmental models of epidemic spread. We test the predictions of our hypotheses with 
simulation models using both synthetic, structured networks, and empirically observed networks.  
Spreading processes on networks can be modeled by generating ensembles of networks weighted 
by their similarity to observed egocentric data on certain key structural features, e.g., using 
Exponential Random Graph Models (Lusher et al., 2012), or in a Bayesian framework the 
networks can be sampled from an estimated posterior distribution of networks consistent with the 
observed data (Goyal et al., 2014). Once the graphs have been generated, a series of dynamic 
processes are run across this collection of graphs (Jenness et al., 2015). However, using this 
modeling approach to explore the impact of truncation would conflate two processes: the 
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truncation process and the network generation process. In order to focus on the former, we 
generate multiple realizations of synthetic full-network datasets with specific network properties, 
and additionally utilize a collection of empirically observed sociocentric networks that can be 
interpreted as multiple network realizations from a larger meta-population. As a result, we are 
able to isolate the effect of degree truncation and explore its impact on spreading processes on 
networks with very different structural properties.  
The impact of contact truncation on structural network properties 
Limiting the number of connections (“alters”) reported by a respondent (“ego”) in both 
egocentric and sociocentric designs is known as a fixed choice design (FCD) (Holland & 
Leinhardt, 1973). This limitation right-censors (imposes an upper bound on) an ego’s out-degree 
(the number of alters nominated by an ego). In sociocentric studies out-degree truncation may in 
turn reduce the in-degree of others, because some existing ties may end up unreported due to the 
constraints on out-degree. (In directed networks the mean in-degree and mean out-degree must 
match, since each edge adds one to the out-degree of the “source” node and one to the in-degree 
of the “sink” node.) Thus in the corresponding undirected network, obtained from the directed 
network simply by ignoring the directions of the edges and considering a mutual or two-way 
nomination as a single edge, the truncated (observed) total degree (either in or out) will be: 
 = 
 	if	 ≤ 
	
	
	otherwise 
where 
 is the FCD truncation value and  each individual’s degree in the truncated network 
graph. For node  with  > 
, edge  between ego  and alter  will be maintained for certain 
only if  < 
, otherwise ego  must nominate alter  in order for the edge to be observed. FCD 
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can be conducted in two ways, as outlined above. The more-common approach of focusing on 
the first 
 or fewer names reported (“weighted truncation”) is likely to lead to bias towards 
stronger contacts, since stronger ties are likely to be more salient to a respondent. This approach 
should thus maximize the proportion of a respondent’s social interactions that is captured. The 
less-common approach of drawing a random subset of all named contacts (“unweighted 
truncation”) will provide a broader picture of the types of contacts a respondent has – notably 
increasing the chance of observing weak ties – at the cost of observing a smaller proportion of 
the respondent’s total social interaction. FCD is known to impact several canonical network 
characteristics, but its effects depend on the structure of the complete network graph (Kossinets, 
2006); we consider next some key properties.  
Degree distribution and assortativity. While the impact of FCD on the network degree 
distribution  is almost always to reduce its mean and variance, its precise effect depends on 
both the first and second moment of the degree distribution and on the ratio of 
 to the mean 
degree . Lower 
/ ratios generally increase (strictly, never decrease) the number of edges 
dropped. Networks with higher-variance degree distributions will also typically lose more edges 
for a given 
/ ratio, insofar as such networks have a larger proportion of nodes with degree 
greater than 
, and thus for any given edge  both  and  are at higher risk of being 
truncated, leading to the edge  being dropped. 
Loss of edges in high-variance networks may, however, be offset by degree-assortativity 
(Kossinets, 2006), often quantified by the Pearson correlation coefficient of degrees of connected 
nodes:  =  (" #$% )'(') , where *+ is the fraction of all edges that join nodes of degree , and -, 
.* and /+ are the fraction of edges that start and end, respectively, at nodes of degree , or -, 
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respectively, and 0$and 0%are the standard deviations of distributions of .* and /+ (Newman, 
2003b). If the network is degree-disassortative, such as the scale-free Barabási-Albert network 
where ~#2 and 2 < γ < 3 (Barabási & Albert, 1999), then edges that might be censored by 
the adjacent high-degree node are less likely to also be censored by the adjacent low-degree 
node, and thus dropped entirely in the truncated network (Vázquez & Moreno, 2003). Degree-
assortative, high-variance networks are thus likely to see the greatest change in ; human 
contact networks are typically somewhat degree-assortative, and while communication contacts 
have fat-tailed degree distributions with high variance, physical contact networks are more 
degree-homogeneous (Onnela et al., 2007a; Onnela et al., 2007b; Salathé et al., 2010). The level 
of degree-assortativity in a network is not itself systematically affected by FCD, so long as edges 
are dropped without regard to the strength of each connection (Kossinets, 2006; Lee et al., 2006). 
However, if individuals are more likely to report stronger connections, and ties between 
individuals of similar degree are more likely to be strong – which is suggested by the 
combination of findings that homophilous ties are more likely to be transitive (Louch, 2000; 
Marsden, 1987) and those with greater transitivity (Onnela et al., 2007b) tend to be stronger – 
then FCD might be expected to artificially inflate . 
Clustering. Local clustering can be measured in at least two different ways: (i) Triadic 
clustering: the mean of local clustering coefficient 6, where 6 is the ratio of the number of ties 
present between all neighbors of node  and ( − 1)/2, the number of pairs of neighbors of  
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998); (ii) Focal clustering: the level of global triadic closure, that is the ratio 
of triangles – where (9, ;), (9, <) and (;, <) are all present – to paths of length two, i.e., if  
(9, ;) and (;, <) exist, they form a path of length two (Newman, 2010). Clustering may also 
occur at higher levels of aggregation in the network, for example in the presence of network 
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communities where, loosely speaking, the density of edges within a set of nodes belonging to a 
community is higher than the average density of edges across the whole graph (Fortunato, 2010; 
Porter et al., 2009). One way to quantify this community-level clustering is by modularity, 
= = ∑ (?? − .?@)? , where ?? is the proportion of edges in the network that connect nodes in 
community  to other nodes in community  and .? is the proportion of ends of edges that are 
attached to nodes in community  (Newman, 2006). The value of modularity can be normalized 
using the degree distribution of the network as =A = = B1 − ∑ C 2D⁄ FG(H, H)? 2D⁄ I⁄ , D is 
the number of edges in the network and G(H, H) is equal to one if H = H and zero otherwise. 
This normalization makes modularity values more readily comparable across networks 
(Newman, 2010). 
When truncation is unweighted, we expect FCD to reduce clustering at the triadic and 
community levels as it effectively results in random edge removal. When truncation is weighted, 
however, FCD might lead to an increase in clustering: if within-cluster edges are stronger than 
others, they are more likely to be preserved.  
Path lengths. In removing ties, unweighted FCD will reduce the fractional size of the largest 
connected component (LCC), JKLL, and will often increase the average path length between 
nodes of the LCC, ℓKLL. If FCD is weighted, however, the rate at which ℓKLL falls may be 
reduced, at the expense of a faster decline in JKLL, as peripherally (weakly) connected nodes are 
preferentially dropped from the LCC. In a network with a dense core, the JKLL is likely to be 
better preserved in a degree-disassortative than in a degree-assortative network under FCD – due 
to the lower probability of ties within the core being dropped from both ends (Kossinets, 2006). 
This effect will be more pronounced if the ties within this core are also stronger than other ties, 
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and thus more likely to be preserved. For some specific threshold value of FCD the LCC will 
fragment, and two previously connected nodes may become disconnected. 
While the above discussion, as is common in network characterizations, considers shortest paths, 
random spreading processes, like random walks, rarely take the shortest path from between two 
given nodes  and . Because of this, the length of the shortest path between nodes  and  in a 
fully observed network typically underestimates the length of the path taken by a stochastic 
spreading process. Partial observation of the network, such as that induced by degree truncation, 
inflates the lengths of shortest paths, but does of course not alter the length of the actual 
unobserved paths taken by the spreading process. For this reason, perhaps somewhat 
paradoxically, shortest paths inferred from partially observed networks can provide more 
accurate predictions of the path lengths taken by spreading processes than those based on fully 
observed  networks (Onnela & Christakis, 2012).  
The impact of structural network properties on spreading processes 
There is a burgeoning literature on the effect of various network properties on spreading process 
outcomes (Barrat et al., 2008; Newman, 2002; Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015). Under assumptions 
of population homogeneity, relatively simple solutions can be found for key properties; however 
these results rarely hold once we allow for any non-trivial network structure (Keeling & Eames, 
2005). We first outline canonical results under homogeneity, and then consider how structural 
network properties impact spreading processes. We focus on two aspects of an outbreak: the 
early stage and the final state. To simplify our analysis, we follow the tradition in this literature 
and focus on models that assume degree infectivity, where an infectious individual can infect all 
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their neighbors in just one time step, rather than unit infectivity, where they can only infect one 
of their neighbors per time step (Staples et al., 2015).  
In the early stages, we are typically interested in two related quantities: the basic reproduction 
numberNO, the number of new incident cases (newly infected individuals) arising from each 
currently infected individual in a fully-susceptible population; and O, the initial exponential (or 
faster) growth rate of an epidemic. NO is defined in all settings as a function of P = QH, where Q 
is the probability of infection per period and H the number of contacts per period, and the rate at 
which individuals recover (or die), ; = 1/R, where D is the mean duration of infectiousness. In 
a homogeneous mass-action model for an infection where recovery leads to immunity, i.e. a 
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model, NO = P/; , where NO ≥ 1 ensures a large outbreak 
with non-zero probability (Hethcote, 2000). O is conceptually equal to P in the first period, but 
thereafter is not well-defined analytically – even in homogenous models – and is typically 
measured empirically as the second moment of the epidemic curve in its initial growth phase 
(Vynnycky & White, 2010). At the end of an outbreak, we can evaluate its overall impact via the 
attack rate	T = ΣV W⁄ , the proportion of the population ever infected.  
Degree distribution and assortativity. In a network setting, NO can be viewed as the average 
number of edges through which an individual infects their neighbors across the whole period of 
their infectiousness if all their neighbors are susceptible. The probability of infection, X, for each 
node can be conceptualized (for degree infectivity) in terms of their degree and their neighbors’ 
infection statuses. In a degree-homogenous network, an epidemic will probabilistically take off if 
X() ≡ X〈〉 ≥ 1; when networks are degree-heterogeneous, the likelihood of epidemic take-off 
becomes a function of the first and second moments of the degree distribution (Newman, 2002). 
In an infinitely large scale-free network where 2 < \ ≤ 3, 〈@〉 → ∞, and thus an epidemic 
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occurs in all cases, regardless of the infection and recovery parameters (Barthelemy et al., 2005; 
Boguñá et al., 2003; May & Lloyd, 2001; Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001). More generally, 
higher degree heterogeneity increases NO.  
Similarly, higher degree-assortativity increases the chances of epidemic take-off. On finite 
networks the probabilistic threshold for epidemic take-off has a lower-bound of 〈_AA〉, the 
average degree of nearest neighbors, which is also the driver of both degenerate results: 〈_AA〉 =
〈〉 in a homogeneous network and 〈_AA〉 → ∞ in an infinitely large scale-free network (Boguñá 
et al., 2003). This is intuitive, since the number of one’s neighbors bounds the number of 
infections one can generate.  
The speed of epidemic growth is closely related to NO and X. On an infinite size, scale-free 
network, O is extensive, since once infection reaches high-degree nodes it spreads to a finite 
fraction of persons at the next time point (Vazquez, 2006a). More generally, an epidemic on any 
scale-free network will see growth at a power law rate such that early in the epidemic infection 
levels will be greater than is predicted by homogeneous models, in which growth rates are 
exponential (Vazquez, 2006b).  
More generally still, degree-assortativity has long been known to lead to faster epidemic take-
off, but a lower final epidemic size, conditional on the number of nodes and ties within a 
network (Gupta et al., 1989). This result arises from a dense core of high-degree nodes in which 
infection is rapidly passed, in combination with longer paths to peripheral, low-degree nodes 
where chains of infection are more likely to die out. 
Clustering. The most straightforward effect of triadic clustering, for a given degree distribution, 
is to reduce the average number of infections each infected person causes. This reduction is due 
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to newly-infected individuals having fewer susceptible neighbors: the contact who infected you 
is likely also have had the opportunity to infect your other contacts (Keeling, 2005; Miller, 2009; 
Molina & Stone, 2012). This does not strictly imply a lower NO, since NO refers to a completely 
susceptible population, however this phenomenon increases the epidemic threshold in the same 
manner that a fall in NO would (Molina & Stone, 2012). Similarly, the epidemic growth rate O is 
somewhat slowed by this reduction in the proportion of susceptible alters (Eames, 2008).  
In many networks, e.g. Erdős–Rényi graphs (Erdős & Rényi, 1959), for a given network density, 
increased clustering also leads to a smaller JKLL, which necessarily reduces the maximum 
possible epidemic size (Newman, 2003a). However, within the LCC clustering increases the 
density of the network (Serrano & Boguná, 2006), providing more local pathways from an 
infected to a susceptible individual. This reduces the protective effect of any alters who have 
recovered without infecting an ego, and thus some simulations have found clustering increases 
the attack rate T (Keeling, 2005; Newman, 2003a).  
Overall, cliques alone appear to have marginal effects on epidemic dynamics, however the 
processes which drive clique formation – such as homophily by nodal attributes or geographic 
proximity –lead to networks displaying clustering that also contain other topological features – 
such as degree-assortativity or heterogeneity – which do significantly affect epidemics, leading 
to processes on clustered networks looking very different from those on non-clustered ones 
(Badham & Stocker, 2010; Molina & Stone, 2012; Volz et al., 2011). Broader community 
structure in networks acts in much the same fashion as cliques, reducing O due to limited 
capacity to pass infection from one community to the next (Salathé & Jones, 2010); although 
epidemics are unhindered, or even sped up, by inter-community ties when overlapping, rather 
than distinctly separated, communities are built into networks (Reid & Hurley, 2011). 
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Conjectured impact of degree truncation on spreading processes 
Based on the above results, we formulate some initial hypotheses about the likely impact of out-
degree truncation on the behavior of spreading processes on the resulting network. First and 
foremost, truncation will reduce the number of edges in the network, since some edges are now 
not observed. This leads to a reduction in mean degree and is likely to increase average path 
lengths and reduce the size of the `KLL; as a result, both O and T will be reduced. The reduction 
in O may however be offset by reduced variance in degree – since out-degree variance is strictly 
reduced by truncation and in-degree variance is likely to drop too. Second, degree truncation by 
tie strength may lead to an inflation of degree-assortativity, if assortative ties are stronger on 
average and thus more likely to be preserved. This should lead to smaller, faster epidemics – 
especially if assortativity is created by preferentially dropping core-periphery links. Finally, 
degree truncation by tie strength will have an unpredictable effect on clustering – depending on 
the relationship between tie strength and community structure. Notably, if the two are strongly 
positively correlated, truncation may increase community structure as weak ties are preferentially 
dropped. If clustering is increased, both Oand A are likely to fall.  
 
Methods 
To test the above hypotheses about the impact of degree truncation on spreading process 
outcomes, we: (1) simulated a truncation process on a range of networks; (2) simulated a 
spreading process on the original (fully observed or ‘full’ network) and truncated networks a 
large number of times; and (3) compared epidemic outcome values for the full and truncated 
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networks (Figure 1). In the following, we describe in detail the following: (A) the network 
generation process; (B) the truncation process; and (C) the spreading process. 
A. Network structures 
We considered four types of synthetic networks that we call Degree-Assortative, Triadic 
Clustering, Focal Clustering, and Power-Law networks, and in addition we considered networks 
based on empirical data (details below). For unweighted synthetic networks, we used edge 
overlap as proxy for tie strength, defined as the fraction of shared network neighbors of a 
connected dyad: a = b B( − 1) + C − 1F − bI⁄ , where b is the number of neighbors  
and  have in common, and  and  are their degrees (Onnela et al., 2007b). Overlap was 
shown to be strongly correlated with tie strength, as conjectured by the weak ties hypothesis 
several decades earlier (Granovetter, 1973). The empirical social networks were collected in 75 
villages in Karnataka, India, which were surveyed as part of a microfinance intervention study in 
2006 (Banerjee et al., 2013a, 2013b). We defined an edge between two individuals to exist if 
either person reported any of the twelve types of social interaction asked about in the study.  
We began synthetic network construction by generating a collection of degree sequences, where 
a degree sequence is a list of node degrees of a network. To generate 100 Degree-Assortative, 
Triadic Clustering, and Focal Clustering networks, each consisting of W = 1000 nodes, we drew 
100 degree sequences of length W from a Poisson distribution e(f)where f = 8, as an 
approximation to a binomial distribution with large N. We used the configuration model to 
generate an initial graph realization for each degree sequence (Molloy & Reed, 1995), and then 
rewired the networks, edge by edge, in order to obtain a collection of calibrated networks such 
that each network closely matches a target value of a chosen characteristic, specifically:  
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1. Degree-Assortative. This was achieved by: (i) selecting two disjoint edges (9, ;) and 
(,, -) uniformly at random; (ii) computing whether removing the two edges and 
replacing them with edges (9, -) and (,, ;) would increase network assortativity; and if 
so (iii) making this change.  
2. Triadic Clustering. This was achieved by: (i) choosing an ego  and two of its alters,  
and , who were not connected to one-another; (ii) adding the edge (, ) to the network, 
thus forming a triangle; and (iii) removing an edge selected uniformly at random 
conditional on that edge not being part of a triangle, thus ensuring increased triadic 
clustering.  
3. Focal Clustering. This was achieved by: (i) selecting three nodes ,  and  uniformly at 
random; (ii) adding edges (, ), (, ) and (, ) if they did not already exist; (iii) 
choosing uniformly at random in the network the same number of edges that were just 
added (excluding edges (, ), (, ) and (, ) in the selection); (iv) computing whether 
removing this second set of edges would result in a net increase in focal clustering – if so, 
removing them; if not, repeating steps (iii) and (iv). 
We generated three versions of each type of synthetic network by calibrating assortativity, triadic 
clustering, and focal clustering to the minimum, median and maximum values of these quantities 
observed in the 75 Karnataka villages (Table 1).  
To generate Power-Law networks, the fourth type of synthetic network, we drew degree 
sequences from a power-law distribution e()~	#2, using the values 3, 2.5 and 2 for the degree 
exponent \. We discarded any ungraphable sequences, i.e. those where any value greater than 
W − 1 = 999 was drawn. We again used the configuration model to generate an initial graph 
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realization for each degree sequence. Note that lower values of \ are associated with degree 
distributions that have increasingly fat tails. 
For each of the four types of synthetic networks, for each level of calibration we generated 100 
independent representative networks using the above methods, for a total of 1200 networks. 
B. Truncation 
We simulated degree truncation of the form typically seen in surveys, by placing a ceiling on the 
number of contacts, 
, that can be reported by a respondent, and then reconstructed the contact 
graph created from all sampled contacts. To do this, we first converted the network into a 
directed graph. We then selectively removed C − 
F directed edges starting from each 
individual , beginning with the edge having the smallest edge overlap value (the “weakest” 
edge); we were thus conducting truncation by tie strength. We truncated at 
 = i〈〉, taking 
values of i = 0.5, 1, 2, so that the maximum out-degree of individuals was half the mean degree 
in the full network, the same as its mean degree, or twice its mean degree. After truncating each 
individual’s out-degree, we collapsed the directed graph into an undirected one based on all 
remaining ties. Examples of this truncation process on 20-node networks are shown in Figure 2. 
We measured a range of network properties for each full and truncated network, including mean 
degree, degree-assortativity, triadic and focal clustering, `KLL and normalized modularity =A – 
this last based on a graph partition for each network using the Louvain method (Blondel et al., 
2008).  
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C. Spreading process 
We ran a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model on the networks defined by the per-period  
(per time step) probabilities P = 0.03 (the probability of an infectious individual infecting each 
susceptible contact) and l = 0.05 (the probability of an infectious individual recovering). Each 
spreading process began with five initial infections, chosen uniformly at random among the 
nodes of a network, and each SIR model was run 100 times on the full and degree truncated 
variants of each of the 100 networks. We measured two categories of outcomes across all of the 
10,000 runs (100 runs per network for 100 networks) of each synthetic network type (7,500 for 
the Karnataka village data), including results from those runs for which at least 10% of 
individuals were ever infected: first, time to infection of the 10th percentile of the population 
(epidemic growth O: mean and 95% range); and second, the proportion of nodes ever infected 
(the attack rate T: mean and 95% range).  
 
Results  
Summary statistics for all networks at all levels of truncation are shown in Supplementary Table 
1. In all networks, both synthetic and empirical, out-degree truncation consistently reduced mean 
degree as expected, most strongly in Power-Law and Focal Clustering networks. Truncation 
strongly reduced degree-assortativity in all cases except for Power-Law networks, which were 
already degree-disassortative, overwhelming any differences originally seen across levels of 
calibration; this effect was weaker for the Karnataka networks than for synthetic networks other 
than Power-Law. Modularity increased with truncation in all networks except for Degree-
Assortative ones (which had very high initial modularity). With the exception of Power-Law and 
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Karnataka networks, where modularity rose smoothly with increasing truncation, most of the 
increase only occurred once networks were truncated at half mean degree. Both triadic and focal 
clustering fell, and the ℓKLL rose, consistently with increasing truncation for all networks in 
which clustering was initially present. 
When epidemics were simulated on the full networks, the attack rate T was ≥10% in almost 
every simulation (over 97.5%), with the exception of Degree-Assortative networks where only 
around 90% of simulations reached T ≥ 10%	(Supplementary Table 2). Truncating networks at 
2〈〉 had almost no impact on the proportion of epidemics with T ≥ 10% for any network, but 
further truncation led to a sharp fall-off. At 0.5〈〉 truncation none of the clustered network 
epidemics reached T ≥ 10%, and only the Power-Law networks, the Degree-Assortative 
networks calibrated to the lowest level of assortativity and the Karnataka networks had more 
than 2% of their epidemic reach the T ≥ 10%	threshold.  
Without truncation, 10% of all nodes were infected within 20 time steps on all networks except 
for the degree-assortative ones – which also showed the greatest range of O (Table 2). 
Truncation at 2〈〉 increased Oin all cases, but not by large amounts; however truncation at 〈〉 
both raised mean O and its variance – notably in the cases of degree-assortative and triadic 
clustering networks (Figure 3A). For those networks in which any runs reached T ≥ 10% at 
0.5〈〉 truncation, both the mean and variance of Oincreased as networks became highly 
fractured. Network structure had a greater impact on T than on O, with clear differences even on 
full networks (Figure 3B). Truncation at 2〈〉 had almost no impact on T except in the cases of 
Power-Law, and to a lesser extent Degree-Assortative, networks. However truncation at 〈〉 
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leads to a mean T roughly halving for all cases except the Karnataka networks, where T only 
falls by about a quarter. Once truncation reached 0.5〈〉, no network type averaged T > 16%. 
 
Discussion 
Simulating a generic spreading process on a range of networks containing different structures, 
we find that the speed and degree to which predictions of process outcomes – specifically initial 
growth rate and final size – are affected by out-degree truncation varies greatly. All processes are 
eventually predicted to have limited impact, however how much truncation is required varies. 
Notably, our ability to predict process outcomes is degraded more rapidly on stylized synthetic 
networks than on a set of empirical social contact networks from villages in Karnataka state, 
India.  
Central to understanding the effect of out-degree truncation on predictions of spreading process 
outcomes is the transition when the network becomes fragmented and the size of the largest 
connected component rapidly decreases. In our analyses, the Power-Law and Degree-Assortative 
networks showed slow declines in predicted process outcomes as truncation increased, while the 
loss of accuracy was more rapid for both Triadic Clustering and Focal Clustering networks – 
which lost fidelity early on – and the Karnataka networks – which maintained fidelity for longer 
(Figure 3). The speed of initial growth was notably more variable for Degree-Assortative 
compared to all other network types for both no truncation and truncation at 2〈〉, reflecting the 
importance of the initial infection sites when networks contain both highly and lowly connected 
regions. This variation in findings suggests that knowledge of the structure of a network for 
which one wishes to predict process spread is crucial in determining the level of resources that 
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should place into measuring the full extent of the network itself: locally clustered networks may 
require more contacts, while those with fat-tailed degree distributions may require fewer. Of 
course, knowing the mean out-degree of a network is a pre-requisite to determining the level of 
truncation that can be tolerated.  
In contrast to our conjectures, in no case did truncation increase either speed or size of process 
spread. The impact of truncation in reducing the number of observed ties appeared to overwhelm 
all other processes, not least by affecting the network characteristics of the truncation networks: 
truncation at 〈〉 led to the Degree-Assortative networks being entirely non-assortative and the 
Triadic Clustering and Focal Clustering networks displaying very limited clustering; only 
modularity appeared to be maintained or even increased as the FCD threshold was lowered – 
potentially because of the breakup of the network into increasingly numbers of unconnected 
components. Further investigation might find levels of truncation at which epidemics severity is 
over-estimated, but in practical terms our findings point to a consistent underestimate of speed 
and attack rate using data truncated by strength.  
In addition to network-level outcomes, it is instructive to consider variability in outcomes at the 
individual level. While it is clear that individuals with higher out-degree are more likely to 
become infected, it is also likely that those with more-connected neighbors will become infected 
more often, since these connected neighbors are more likely to be infected in the first place. This 
association can be seen in Figure 4 for the Karnataka networks (and Supplementary Figure 3 for 
synthetic networks). Low degree individuals are unlikely to be infected regardless of how well-
connected their neighbors are, but for our exemplar infection neighbor degree has little impact 
for those with own degree greater than ten (Figure 4B). As truncation increases – and has a 
disproportionate impact on ties dropped to higher-degree neighbors – individuals with lower 
22 
 
mean degree neighbors are predicted to be infected less often than those with the same degree, 
but lower mean neighbor degree (Figure 4C and D). This effect is particularly visible at the 
common FCD value of 〈〉. These findings highlight that not only can truncation impact 
population-level predictions of infection risk, but they may also differentially affect individual-
level predictions.  
There are several ways in which this analysis could be extended. First, it might be informative to 
consider unweighted, rather than weighted, truncation. Weighted truncation is likely to minimize 
mis-estimation of local spreading processes, since close-knit groups are likely to be maintained 
at the expense of a realistic picture of cross-community connections. Unweighted truncation, in 
contrast, is likely to reduce the speed of epidemic spread generally, but maintain weak ties that 
span structural holes in the network(Burt, 2004). Second, one could investigate spreading 
processes based on edge weights, or using unit infectivity. Third, it might be worthwhile to run 
these analyses for a wide range of truncation levels, in order to evaluate which networks have 
more or less rapid transitions from relatively accurate epidemic predictions to relatively 
inaccurate ones, and at what level of truncation these transitions occur. Such an analysis would 
be particularly useful in the context of a specific empirical network and spreading process, rather 
than in the theoretical cases presented in this paper, as a precursor to the conduct of data 
collection in a survey. While we have used a range of network structures and a standard 
spreading process, our results are limited to the cases we have considered, and thus investigation 
of other structures and processes might be worthwhile. 
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to arrive at more accurate predictions of process outcomes in 
the context of truncated contact data, the type of data that are common in the study of infectious 
diseases and public health interventions. In addition to our simulation approach, there is the 
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potential for analytic work to evaluate the level of mis-prediction likely to arise under a given 
level of degree truncation, for given network structures. Ultimately, this should allow for us to 
adjust predictions for truncation. Such an approach might use statistical or mechanistic network 
models to simulate full networks congruent with both the estimated rate of truncation, and 
observed characteristics of the truncated network; simulations could then be run on these 
simulated networks to predict process outcomes. As noted above, although we have framed out-
degree truncation here as resulting from the adoption of FCD, our methods are agnostic to the 
cause of truncation. Consequently our results may generalize to settings where some other 
mechanism, such as social stigma in the case of self-reported sexual networks, might lead to out-
degree truncation.  
Finally, there has been increasing research activity in the past few years into digitally mediated 
social networks, such as those resulting from mobile phone call and communication patterns.  
Reliance on these types of data requires the investigator to specify the width of the data 
aggregation window and other similar parameters, leading to effective degree truncation that is 
similar in its effects to the truncation resulting here from study design. It seems plausible that 
some of the insights we have obtained here, as well as some of our methods, could be translated 
to this research context. 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown, via simulation, that truncation of a network via FCD has a systematic impact on 
how processes are predicted to spread across this network. However, the degree of impact varies 
strongly by the level of truncation, and we find that the transition level – at which impact on 
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predicted process outcomes shifts from small to considerable – varies by network structure. 
Supplementary information on the structure of the full network – potentially estimated from past 
egocentric or sociocentric studies in the same or similar populations – will thus often be crucial 
for increasing the accuracy of predictions of process spread for truncated network data.  
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Supplementary material 
Supplementary Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the calibrated network graphs (mean and 95% 
confidence intervals) 
Supplementary Table 2: Percentage of epidemic simulation runs infecting at least 10% of the 
population 
 
Supplementary Figure 1: Time to infection of 10% of all individuals on networks, amongst 
epidemic simulation runs infecting at least 10% of the population 
Supplementary Figure 2: Epidemic attack rate on networks, amongst epidemic simulation runs 
infecting at least 10% of the population. 
Supplementary Figure 3: Mean neighbor degree vs. own degree for full and truncated synthetic 
networks 
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Table 1: Target characteristic values for calibrated synthetic networks  
 
 Minimum Median Maximum 
Degree-assortativity coefficient (r) 0.283 0.421 0.797 
Triadic clustering coefficient (c) 0.249 0.284 0.353 
Focal clustering coefficient (t) 0.163 0.249 0.326 
Power-law degree exponent (γ) -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 
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Table 2: Population-level outcomes amongst epidemic simulation runs infecting at least 10% of the population 
 No truncation  
Truncation at  
twice mean degree  
Truncation at  
mean degree  
Truncation at  
half mean degree 
Time to infection of 10% of population            
  Degree-Assortative 35.0 [20.0 - 85.0] 51.0 [27.9 - 120.9] 119.9 [67.1 - 185.0] 138.0 [81.0 - 188.0] 
  Triadic Clustering 17.0 [12.0 - 27.0] 22.0 [15.0 - 34.0] 61.0 [36.0 - 127.0] 
  Focal Clustering 18.0 [11.0 - 39.0] 32.0 [20.0 - 65.0] 96.9 [51.9 - 174.4] 
  Power-Law  8.0 [5.0 - 19.0] 16.9 [9.0 - 38.0] 40.0 [17.9 - 107.1] 72.9 [35.0 - 153.1] 
  Karnataka villages 15.0 [9.0 - 27.0] 21.0 [12.3 - 40.0] 43.0 [23.0 - 100.9] 88.4 [39.0 - 175.4] 
  
Percentage of all individuals ever infectious            
  Degree-Assortative 46.6 [39.3 - 52.8] 39.5 [27.4 - 47.2] 15.2 [10.4 - 26.4] 11.5 [10.2 - 16.6] 
  Triadic Clustering 85.8 [83.4 - 87.9] 84.4 [81.6 - 86.7] 41.8 [18.8 - 54.1] 
  Focal Clustering 60.2 [55.0 - 65.0] 58.0 [51.0 - 63.2] 15.7 [10.5 - 27.4] 
  Power-Law  58.8 [51.5 - 65.1] 41.1 [32.6 - 48.2] 22.2 [12.6 - 30.0] 15.9 [10.6 - 27.5] 
  Karnataka villages 78.1 [68.9 - 83.9] 76.2 [65.6 - 82.9] 57.5 [20.1 - 70.9] 13.9 [10.3 - 24.2] 
Percentage of 47,500 epidemics  
infecting at least 10% of the population 96.5   93.1   66.0   7.1  
 
Figures show mean and 95% ranges for all runs from 10,000 simulations (7,500 for Karnataka villages) for which at least of 10% of 
individuals were ever infected. Note that the proportion of retained networks falls as the level of truncation rises (see Supplementary 
Table 2 for details); empty cells represent simulation types where no runs reached the 10% threshold. All network structures are those 
with highest network properties in each category (see Methods and Table 1).  
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Figure 1: Schematic of study methodology  
 
(1) For synthetic networks, 100 degree sequences were were generated. For the Karnataka village data, 75 empirical village datasets 
were used, and step 2 skipped. (2) Each degree sequence was converted into a network graph using the configuration model, and then 
each synthetic graph was calibrated based on target network values. (3) All networks were truncated at twice mean, mean and half 
mean degree. (4) 100 epidemics were run across each full and truncated network.
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Figure 2: Toy examples of truncation process for different synthetic graphs 
 
This figure shows three graphs each containing 20 nodes and with a mean degree of approximately 5. Each was generated by 
calibrating a configuration-generated graph through rewiring to achieve specific target values of different network characteristics. The 
top row shows each calibrated graph with edges marked in grey; the bottom row superimposes in orange the edges removed by 
truncating by tie strength at an out-degree of 3.  
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Figure 3: Epidemic outcomes for simulation runs infecting at least 10% of the population across six network structures 
A. B.  
 
Figures show mean and 95% ranges for all runs from 10,000 simulations (7,500 for Karnataka villages) for which at least of 10% of 
individuals were ever infected. Simulation types are defined by out-degree truncation (Circles: no truncation; Hexagons: truncation at 
twice mean degree; Squares: truncation at mean degree; Triangles: truncation at half mean degree). All network structures are those 
with highest network properties in each category (see Methods and Table 1; full results for each network structure are available in 
Supplementary Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure 2).  Empty lines represent simulation types where no runs reached the 10% 
threshold.  
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Figure 4: Mean neighbor degree vs. own degree for full and truncated Karnataka village 
contact networks 
 
A. Density of ties in full graph (log-scale); B-D: Mean proportion of epidemic runs in which the 
node was infected (linear scale). The black diagonal line shows points of equal node and mean 
neighbor degree. In the full graph, most nodes are infected most of the time, except those with 
either very low degree or very low mean neighbor degree. When truncated at mean degree those 
with middling degree and mean neighbor degree are infected less often. When truncated at half 
mean degree almost no nodes are ever infected.  
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Supplementary material 
Title: Impact of degree truncation on the spread of a contagious process on networks 
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Supplementary Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the calibrated network graphs (mean and 95% confidence intervals) 
A. Mean degree 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 8.39  [7.84 - 8.97]  7.21  [6.72 - 7.60]  5.54  [4.77 - 5.65]  3.90  [2.78 - 3.95] 
Synthetic networks:             
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 7.86  [7.86 - 7.86]  7.68  [7.67 - 7.68]  5.74  [5.72 - 5.76]  3.22  [3.20 - 3.24] 
r = 0.421 7.86  [7.86 - 7.86]  7.64  [7.63 - 7.65]  5.67  [5.65 - 5.69]  3.16  [3.13 - 3.18] 
r = 0.797 7.86  [7.86 - 7.86]  7.54  [7.53 - 7.55]  5.40  [5.38 - 5.42]  2.93  [2.91 - 2.95] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 7.75  [7.75 - 7.75]  7.40  [7.39 - 7.42]  5.56  [5.53 - 5.58]  3.12  [3.10 - 3.13] 
c = 0.284 7.75  [7.75 - 7.75]  7.39  [7.36 - 7.40]  5.55  [5.52 - 5.57]  3.19  [3.17 - 3.20] 
c = 0.353 7.75  [7.75 - 7.75]  7.31  [7.29 - 7.33]  5.51  [5.48 - 5.53]  3.32  [3.30 - 3.33] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 7.95  [7.95 - 7.95]  6.84  [6.78 - 6.88]  4.49  [4.46 - 4.54]  2.57  [2.54 - 2.59] 
t = 0.249 7.95  [7.95 - 7.95]  6.29  [6.17 - 6.37]  4.07  [4.00 - 4.12]  2.32  [2.28 - 2.35] 
t = 0.326 7.95  [7.95 - 7.95]  5.84  [5.73 - 5.92]  3.76  [3.67 - 3.83]  2.15  [2.11 - 2.20] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 7.78  [7.66 - 7.83]  6.58  [6.50 - 6.63]  4.70  [4.66 - 4.74]  2.89  [2.87 - 2.91] 
γ = 2.5 7.40  [7.04 - 7.55]  6.22  [5.97 - 6.33]  4.60  [4.56 - 4.65]  2.91  [2.89 - 2.93] 
γ = 2 6.18  [5.89 - 6.46]  4.78  [4.44 - 5.02]  4.00  [3.51 - 4.18]  2.88  [2.85 - 2.91] 
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B. Degree-assortativity 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 0.33  [0.30 - 0.37]  0.23  [0.20 - 0.25]  0.11  [0.09 - 0.13]  0.02  [-0.02 - 0.05] 
Synthetic networks defined by:             
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 0.28  [0.28 - 0.28]  0.25  [0.25 - 0.26]  -0.02  [-0.03 - -0.01]  -0.19  [-0.20 - -0.18] 
r = 0.421 0.42  [0.42 - 0.42]  0.38  [0.37 - 0.38]  -0.00  [-0.01 - 0.01]  -0.19  [-0.20 - -0.17] 
r = 0.797 0.80  [0.80 - 0.80]  0.69  [0.68 - 0.69]  -0.00  [-0.02 - 0.01]  -0.20  [-0.21 - -0.18] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 
-0.05  [-0.06 - -0.04]  -0.10  [-0.11 - -0.09]  -0.16  [-0.17 - -0.15]  -0.25  [-0.27 - -0.24] 
c = 0.284 
-0.05  [-0.06 - -0.04]  -0.10  [-0.11 - -0.09]  -0.17  [-0.18 - -0.16]  -0.26  [-0.27 - -0.25] 
c = 0.353 
-0.06  [-0.07 - -0.05]  -0.11  [-0.12 - -0.10]  -0.18  [-0.19 - -0.17]  -0.27  [-0.28 - -0.26] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 0.26  [0.23 - 0.29]  0.11  [0.09 - 0.12]  -0.07  [-0.08 - -0.06]  -0.18  [-0.20 - -0.17] 
t = 0.249 0.50  [0.46 - 0.55]  0.12  [0.11 - 0.14]  -0.10  [-0.11 - -0.08]  -0.20  [-0.22 - -0.19] 
t = 0.326 0.68  [0.65 - 0.72]  0.08  [0.07 - 0.10]  -0.14  [-0.15 - -0.13]  -0.23  [-0.25 - -0.21] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 
-0.04  [-0.06 - -0.03]  -0.11  [-0.13 - -0.09]  -0.12  [-0.15 - -0.10]  -0.14  [-0.18 - -0.10] 
γ = 2.5 
-0.10  [-0.13 - -0.08]  -0.14  [-0.16 - -0.12]  -0.14  [-0.16 - -0.11]  -0.14  [-0.16 - -0.12] 
γ = 2 
-0.22  [-0.24 - -0.20]  -0.24  [-0.26 - -0.21]  -0.23  [-0.26 - -0.21]  -0.22  [-0.25 - -0.20] 
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C. Modularity 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 0.79  [0.77 - 0.82] 
 
0.81  [0.79 - 0.84] 
 
0.84  [0.82 - 0.86] 
 
0.87  [0.84 - 0.90] 
Synthetic networks defined by:             
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 0.29  [0.29 - 0.29] 
 
0.30  [0.30 - 0.30] 
 
0.40  [0.40 - 0.41] 
 
0.66  [0.65 - 0.66] 
r = 0.421 0.28  [0.28 - 0.29] 
 
0.30  [0.30 - 0.30] 
 
0.41  [0.40 - 0.41] 
 
0.66  [0.66 - 0.67] 
r = 0.797 0.28  [0.28 - 0.28] 
 
0.30  [0.30 - 0.30] 
 
0.44  [0.43 - 0.45] 
 
0.71  [0.71 - 0.72] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 0.46  [0.45 - 0.46] 
 
0.46  [0.45 - 0.46] 
 
0.48  [0.48 - 0.49] 
 
0.68  [0.67 - 0.68] 
c = 0.284 0.47  [0.47 - 0.48] 
 
0.47  [0.47 - 0.48] 
 
0.49  [0.49 - 0.50] 
 
0.67  [0.67 - 0.68] 
c = 0.353 0.50  [0.49 - 0.50] 
 
0.50  [0.49 - 0.50] 
 
0.52  [0.51 - 0.52] 
 
0.66  [0.66 - 0.67] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 0.66  [0.65 - 0.67] 
 
0.62  [0.61 - 0.63] 
 
0.60  [0.59 - 0.60] 
 
0.76  [0.76 - 0.77] 
t = 0.249 0.82  [0.81 - 0.83] 
 
0.78  [0.77 - 0.79] 
 
0.72  [0.72 - 0.74] 
 
0.81  [0.81 - 0.82] 
t = 0.326 0.90  [0.89 - 0.91] 
 
0.87  [0.86 - 0.89] 
 
0.83  [0.81 - 0.84] 
 
0.86  [0.85 - 0.87] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 0.36  [0.36 - 0.36] 
 
0.32  [0.31 - 0.32] 
 
0.43  [0.43 - 0.44] 
 
0.68  [0.67 - 0.69] 
γ = 2.5 0.36  [0.35 - 0.36] 
 
0.34  [0.33 - 0.35] 
 
0.45  [0.45 - 0.46] 
 
0.68  [0.67 - 0.68] 
γ = 2 0.37  [0.36 - 0.38] 
 
0.43  [0.41 - 0.45] 
 
0.50  [0.49 - 0.56] 
 
0.68  [0.67 - 0.68] 
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D. Triadic clustering coefficient 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 0.64  [0.63 - 0.66]  0.60  [0.57 - 0.61]  0.50  [0.48 - 0.51]  0.34  [0.27 - 0.37] 
Synthetic networks defined by:             
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
r = 0.421 0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
r = 0.797 0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 0.29  [0.29 - 0.30]  0.26  [0.26 - 0.26]  0.13  [0.12 - 0.13]  0.03  [0.03 - 0.04] 
c = 0.284 0.34  [0.34 - 0.34]  0.30  [0.29 - 0.30]  0.15  [0.15 - 0.16]  0.04  [0.04 - 0.05] 
c = 0.353 0.43  [0.43 - 0.43]  0.37  [0.36 - 0.37]  0.20  [0.19 - 0.20]  0.07  [0.06 - 0.07] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 0.37  [0.37 - 0.38]  0.28  [0.27 - 0.28]  0.12  [0.12 - 0.13]  0.04  [0.04 - 0.05] 
t = 0.249 0.43  [0.42 - 0.44]  0.30  [0.29 - 0.31]  0.15  [0.13 - 0.15]  0.06  [0.05 - 0.06] 
t = 0.326 0.45  [0.44 - 0.46]  0.31  [0.30 - 0.32]  0.16  [0.15 - 0.17]  0.06  [0.05 - 0.07] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 0.04  [0.03 - 0.05]  0.02  [0.02 - 0.02]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.01] 
γ = 2.5 0.09  [0.07 - 0.13]  0.04  [0.03 - 0.05]  0.02  [0.02 - 0.03]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01] 
γ = 2 0.21  [0.19 - 0.22]  0.05  [0.04 - 0.06]  0.03  [0.03 - 0.03]  0.02  [0.01 - 0.02] 
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E. Focal clustering coefficient 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 0.19  [0.17 - 0.21]  0.18  [0.16 - 0.19]  0.16  [0.15 - 0.17]  0.11  [0.08 - 0.12] 
Synthetic networks defined by: 
           
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
r = 0.421 0.01  [0.00 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
r = 0.797 0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 0.07  [0.07 - 0.07]  0.06  [0.06 - 0.06]  0.03  [0.03 - 0.03]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01] 
c = 0.284 0.08  [0.08 - 0.08]  0.07  [0.07 - 0.07]  0.03  [0.03 - 0.03]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01] 
c = 0.353 0.09  [0.08 - 0.09]  0.07  [0.07 - 0.07]  0.04  [0.04 - 0.04]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 0.16  [0.16 - 0.16]  0.11  [0.10 - 0.11]  0.05  [0.04 - 0.05]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.02] 
t = 0.249 0.25  [0.25 - 0.25]  0.14  [0.13 - 0.14]  0.06  [0.06 - 0.06]  0.02  [0.02 - 0.02] 
t = 0.326 0.33  [0.33 - 0.33]  0.15  [0.15 - 0.16]  0.07  [0.06 - 0.07]  0.02  [0.02 - 0.03] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 0.02  [0.02 - 0.02]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
γ = 2.5 0.03  [0.02 - 0.03]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
γ = 2 0.04  [0.04 - 0.05]  0.01  [0.01 - 0.01]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00]  0.00  [0.00 - 0.00] 
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F. Average shortest path in Largest Connected Component 
  Not truncated  Truncated at 2〈〉  Truncated at  〈〉  Truncated at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 4.10  [3.89 - 4.36]  4.43  [4.19 - 4.68]  5.30  [5.00 - 5.82]  7.09  [6.56 - 9.23] 
Synthetic networks defined by:             
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 3.61  [3.61 - 3.62]  3.65  [3.65 - 3.65]  4.17  [4.16 - 4.18]  6.17  [6.13 - 6.23] 
r = 0.421 3.65  [3.65 - 3.65]  3.69  [3.69 - 3.69]  4.22  [4.21 - 4.23]  6.36  [6.29 - 6.41] 
r = 0.797 3.88  [3.87 - 3.88]  3.91  [3.90 - 3.91]  4.47  [4.47 - 4.48]  7.36  [7.28 - 7.46] 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 3.71  [3.70 - 3.72]  3.78  [3.77 - 3.79]  4.22  [4.20 - 4.23]  6.35  [6.28 - 6.42] 
c = 0.284 3.70  [3.70 - 3.72]  3.78  [3.77 - 3.79]  4.21  [4.20 - 4.23]  6.11  [6.05 - 6.17] 
c = 0.353 3.69  [3.68 - 3.70]  3.78  [3.77 - 3.79]  4.20  [4.18 - 4.22]  5.75  [5.70 - 5.80] 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 4.09  [4.07 - 4.12]  4.21  [4.18 - 4.23]  4.91  [4.88 - 4.94]  7.94  [7.84 - 8.07] 
t = 0.249 4.61  [4.56 - 4.66]  4.73  [4.68 - 4.78]  5.39  [5.34 - 5.45]  8.33  [8.26 - 8.47] 
t = 0.326 5.23  [5.10 - 5.39]  5.34  [5.20 - 5.51]  5.98  [5.83 - 6.17]  8.85  [8.60 - 9.14] 
  Power-Law γ = 3 3.35  [3.30 - 3.38]  3.61  [3.56 - 3.64]  4.25  [4.18 - 4.30]  6.34  [6.12 - 6.51] 
γ = 2.5 3.16  [3.09 - 3.23]  3.43  [3.36 - 3.51]  3.93  [3.79 - 4.06]  5.52  [5.22 - 5.80] 
γ = 2 3.07  [3.03 - 3.10]  3.50  [3.45 - 3.54]  3.85  [3.79 - 3.93]  4.70  [4.59 - 4.83] 
 
〈〉: Mean degree of nodes in a given graph. For definitions of , c, o, \ and G and how they define each synthetic network type, please 
see main text of paper.  
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Supplementary Table 2: Percentage of epidemic simulation runs infecting at least 10% of 
the population 
  
Not 
truncated 
 Truncated 
at 2〈〉 
 Truncated 
at  〈〉 
 Truncated 
at  0.5〈〉 
Karnataka villages 99.5 
 
99.3 
 
90.4 
 
11.9 
Synthetic networks defined by:         
  Degree-Assortative r = 0.283 91.1 
 
90.1 
 
76.0 
 
11.7 
r = 0.421 89.9 
 
88.9 
 
69.3 
 
8.7 
r = 0.797 89.1 
 
82.6 
 
26.7 
 
1.0 
  Triadic Clustering c = 0.249 99.8 
 
99.8 
 
87.3 
 
0.0 
c = 0.284 99.9 
 
99.8 
 
92.1 
 
0.0 
c = 0.353 99.8 
 
99.8 
 
95.9 
 
0.0 
  Focal Clustering t = 0.163 99.6 
 
99.4 
 
55.6 
 
0.0 
t = 0.249 98.9 
 
98.3 
 
66.0 
 
0.0 
t = 0.326 97.5 
 
96.4 
 
66.7 
 
0.0 
  Power-Law γ = 3 98.6 
 
92.1 
 
43.6 
 
9.7 
γ = 2.5 98.9 
 
95.1 
 
51.9 
 
15.0 
γ = 2 97.5 
 
89.1 
 
56.3 
 
23.8 
 
Figures are percentage points of 10,000 runs (synthetic networks) or 7500 runs (Karnataka 
villages).  
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Supplementary Figure 1: Time to infection of 10% of all individuals on networks, amongst 
epidemic simulation runs infecting at least 10% of the population 
 
A: Karnataka villages; B: Degree-Assortative; C: Triadic Clustering; D: Focal Clustering; E: 
Power-Law networks. Figures show mean and 95% ranges for all runs from 10,000 simulations 
(7,500 for Karnataka villages) for which at least of 10% of individuals were ever infected. 
Simulation types are defined by truncation (see legend) and level of calibration – darker shading 
represents stronger calibration towards higher values of network properties (see Table 1).  Empty 
lines represent simulation types where no runs reached the 10% threshold.  
45 
 
Supplementary Figure 2: Epidemic attack rate on networks, amongst epidemic simulation 
runs infecting at least 10% of the population. 
 
 
A: Karnataka villages; B: Degree-Assortative; C: Triadic Clustering; D: Focal Clustering; E: 
Power-Law networks. Figures show mean and 95% ranges for all runs from 10,000 simulations 
(7,500 for Karnataka villages) for which at least of 10% of individuals were ever infected. 
Simulation types are defined by truncation (see legend) and level of calibration – darker shading 
represents stronger calibration towards higher values of network properties (see Table 1).  Empty 
lines represent simulation types where no runs reached the 10% threshold.  
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Supplementary Figure 3: Mean neighbor degree vs. own degree for full and truncated 
synthetic networks 
For each set of figures below: 
A. Full graph; B: graph truncated at twice mean degree; C: graph truncated at mean degree; D: 
graph truncated at half mean degree. Within each cell, darker=more: Blue (A1): Initial density of 
ties (log-scale); Green (B1, C1, D1): Mean proportion of neighbors dropped (linear scale); Red-
Yellow (A2, B2, C2, D2): Mean proportion of epidemic runs in which the node was infected 
(linear scale). The black diagonal line shows points of equal node and mean neighbor degree. 
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I. Degree-Assortative 
A1. A2.  
B1. B2.  
C1. C2.  
D1. D2.  
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II. Triadic Clustering 
A1. A2.  
B1. B2.  
C1. C2.  
D1. D2.  
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III. Focal Clustering 
A1. A2.  
B1. B2.  
C1. C2.   
D1.  D2.  
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IV. Power-Law degree distribution 
A1. A2.  
B1. B2.  
C1. C2.  
D1. D2.  
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V. Karnataka villages 
A1. A2.    
B1. B2.  
C1. C2.   
D1. D2.  
